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CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH: WHO DECIDES?
Lucian A. Bebchuk* and Robert J. Jackson, Jr.**
For Professor Victor Brudney, who long ago anticipated the significance of corporate law
rules for regulating corporate political speech.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court spoke clearly this Term on the issue of cor-
porate political speech, concluding in Citizens United v. FEC' that
the First Amendment protects corporations' freedom to spend corpo-
rate funds on indirect support of political candidates. 2 Constitutional
law scholars will long debate the wisdom of that holding, as do the au-
thors of the two other Comments in this issue.3 In contrast, this
Comment accepts as given that corporations may not be limited from
spending money on politics should they decide to speak. We focus in-
stead on an important question left unanswered by Citizens United:
who should have the power to decide whether a corporation will
engage in political speech?
Under existing law, a corporation's decision to engage in political
speech is governed by the same rules as ordinary business decisions,
which give directors and executives virtually plenary authority. In this
Comment, we argue that such rules are inappropriate for corporate po-
* William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and
Finance and Director of the Corporate Governance Program, Harvard Law School.
** Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
Although Professor Jackson recently served as an advisor to senior officials at the Depart-
ment of the Treasury on matters related to corporate governance and Professor Bebchuk recently
served as an advisor to the Department of the Treasury's Office of the Special Master for TARP
Executive Compensation, their work on this Comment commenced after their government affili-
ations ended, and the views expressed in this Comment are solely their own.
We would like to thank Gabriella Blum, Richard Briffault, Victor Brudney, Bob Clark,
John Coates, Jack Coffee, Allen Ferrell, Merritt Fox, Bruce Freed, Charles Fried, Jesse Fried, Jeff
Gordon, Larry Lessig, John Manning, Frank Michelman, Henry Monaghan, Hashim Mooppan,
Trevor Morrison, Nate Persily, Richard Pildes, Karl J. Sandstrom, Christina J. Saunders, Mark A.
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1 3o S. Ct. 876 (2oo).
2 Id. atg 3.
3 See Samuel Issacharoff, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term - Comment: On Political Corrup-
tion, 124 HARV. L. REV. II8 (20o0); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term -
Comment: Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARv. L. REV. 143 (200).
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litical speech decisions. Instead, lawmakers should develop special
rules to govern who may make political speech decisions on behalf of
corporations. We analyze the types of rules that lawmakers should
consider. We also offer a set of proposals, and policymaking consider-
ations, for designing such rules.
In Part II, we consider existing corporate law rules governing the
political speech decision. As long as corporations are permitted to en-
gage in political speech, we show, decisional rules governing whether
and how they decide to do so are inevitable. Under existing corporate
law rules, corporate political speech decisions are subject to the same
rules as ordinary business decisions. Accordingly, corporate political
speech decisions do not require shareholder input, a role for indepen-
dent directors, or disclosure - the safeguards that corporate law rules
establish for special corporate decisions.
We explain that the interests of directors and executives with re-
spect to political speech decisions may diverge from those of share-
holders,4 that the financial implications of these decisions are hardly
trivial, and that the costs of the divergence of interests may be exacer-
bated by the special expressive significance that these decisions carry
for shareholders. We conclude that political speech decisions are sub-
stantially different from, and should not be subject to the same rules
as, ordinary business decisions.
In Part III, we assess lawmakers' choices with respect to rules that
would align corporate political speech decisions with shareholder in-
terests. In particular, we suggest that lawmakers consider adopting
rules that (i) provide shareholders with a role in determining the
amount and targets of corporate political spending; (ii) require that in-
dependent directors oversee corporate political speech decisions; (iii)
allow shareholders to opt out of - that is, either tighten or relax -
each of these first two rules; and (iv) mandate detailed and robust dis-
closure to shareholders of the amounts and beneficiaries of a corpora-
tion's political spending, whether made directly by the company or in-
directly through intermediaries. We explain how such rules would
benefit shareholders. We also explain why the proposed rules are best
viewed not as limitations on corporations' speech rights but rather as a
method of determining whether the corporation actually wishes to en-
gage in political speech. Thus, these rules protect, rather than abridge,
corporations' First Amendment interests.
4 For ease of exposition, throughout this Comment we shall refer to the preferences of a ma-
jority of shareholders of a corporation as reflecting the preferences of shareholders on the whole.
In Part IV, we focus on differences in shareholder preferences, and consider the extent to which
the preferences of a majority of the shareholders with respect to corporate political speech should
be imposed on the minority.
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Part IV discusses an additional objective that decisional rules con-
cerning corporations' political speech may seek to serve: the protection
of minority shareholders from forced association with political speech
supported by a majority of shareholders. We discuss the economic and
First Amendment interests of minority shareholders that lawmakers
may seek to protect. Although we conclude that requiring unanimous
shareholder approval for corporate political speech would likely be
neither desirable nor permissible, we argue that decisional rules ad-
dressing political spending opposed by a sufficiently large minority of
shareholders should be viewed as constitutionally permissible, and we
discuss how lawmakers could best design such rules.
In our view, as long as corporations have the freedom to engage
in political spending, the types of decisional rules we describe in this
Comment will be desirable. While Citizens United expanded the
scope of corporate resources that may be used for such speech, sub-
stantial corporate political spending was permitted before the deci-
sion.5 The expansion of the scope of constitutionally protected corpo-
rate political speech brought about by Citizens United, however,
makes the need for such rules all the more pressing.
II. CHOOSING CORPORATE LAw RULES FOR
POLITICAL SPEECH DECISIONS
In this Part, we consider the need for corporate law rules to govern
the corporate political speech decision. In section A we show that,
given the nature of corporations, legal rules are necessary to determine
whether and when a corporation wishes to speak, and Citizens United
itself assumed the existence of such rules. Section B briefly describes
the current corporate law treatment of political speech decisions,
which subjects those decisions to the same rules that apply to ordinary
business decisions. Section C explains how political speech decisions
differ from ordinary business decisions - and why the existing rules
governing political speech decisions are inadequate.
For ease of exposition, we use the term "corporate law" to refer to
all sources of law - including state corporate law, federal securities
law, and listing standards promulgated by the national securities ex-
changes - that govern firms' internal allocation of authority and rela-
5 Of course, some corporate political speech also remains impermissible even after Citizens
United. For example, federal law still prohibits corporations from coordinating expenditures with
candidates or providing them with direct contributions, see 2 U.S.C. § 44 1b (2006), and has done
so for over a century, see Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and
the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1103 (2002) (describing the ini-
tial passage of the Tillman Act, which made it illegal for corporations to make financial contribu-
tions directly to candidates for federal office, in 1907). The Citizens United decision did not ex-
pressly address its implications for such political spending.
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tionships with shareholders. In addition, the term "lawmakers" refers
to all federal and state legislators and regulators responsible for corpo-
rate law rules (although there is reason to expect that certain rules are
most likely to be developed through federal intervention6 ). Through-
out, we focus on political speech decisions by large, publicly traded
companies, which deploy a significant fraction of corporate capital in
the United States and are often subject to a distinct set of corporate
law rules.
A. The Inevitability of Corporate Law
Rules Concerning Political Speech
When the political speech of a natural person is afforded constitu-
tional protection, there is usually little question whether the individ-
ual wants to engage in the protected speech. But when constitutional
protections are accorded to corporate speech, the law must address a
predicate question: how do we know that the company wishes to en-
gage in the protected speech? A corporation, after all, is not a natural,
Platonic entity. It is a legal arrangement, and its internal allocation of
authority is a product of legal rules. Thus, as Professor Victor Brud-
ney explained nearly three decades ago, law is needed "to allocate the
corporation's capacity to become a 'speaker."
Indeed, in Citizens United itself the Court explicitly acknowledged
the existence of legal rules that allocate corporate decisionmaking au-
thority. Justice Kennedy's opinion for the majority expressly referred
to "the procedures of corporate democracy" that govern corporate deci-
sions to engage in political speech.8
Existing law establishes an elaborate system of rules governing
corporate decisionmaking authority. Under that system, the distribu-
tion of decisionmaking power is governed to a substantial extent by
state law. However, for the large, publicly traded corporations on
which we focus, there are additional layers of federal law that supple-
ment - and occasionally override - state law.
For present purposes, however, the precise nature of these rules is
not important. What is important is that, given the existence of consti-
tutionally protected corporate political speech, legal rules are needed to
govern how corporations make the decision to engage in such speech.
6 See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons
from History, io6 COLUM. L. REV. 1793 (2oo6) (documenting that, over the past seven decades,
most corporate law rules that constrain insider behavior have been developed through federal
intervention).
7 Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under the First Amend-
ment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 241 (ig81).
8 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
794 (1978)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
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B. Existing Corporate Law Rules
Under existing corporate law rules, political speech decisions are by
default governed by the same rules as ordinary business decisions. As
a result, with respect to corporate political speech decisions, there is
under current corporate law (i) no role for shareholders; (ii) no manda-
tory role for independent directors; and (iii) no mandatory disclosure
to investors.
As to the role of shareholders, corporate law rules provide share-
holders with a role in certain special corporate decisions, such as deci-
sions to merge, amend the charter or bylaws, or approve equity com-
pensation plans.9 However, shareholders are generally not able to
enact binding resolutions with respect to ordinary business decisions,
which currently include corporate decisions to engage in political
speech. In particular, under the basic rules of state law, shareholders
do not have the right to vote directly on, or to enact bylaws address-
ing, the ordinary business decisions of the corporation.' 0
Under federal proxy rules, shareholders are permitted to offer advi-
sory proposals with respect to some issues." But the types of propos-
als that shareholders may offer are limited, and the distinction be-
tween proposals that directors and executives may exclude from the
proxy and those that must be included is far from clear. For example,
9 For examples of corporate law arrangements involving shareholder approval, see DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 25 I(c) (2001 & West 2010), which requires such approval for certain mergers;
id. § 24 2(b), which requires such approval for charter amendments; and Order Approving NYSE
and Nasdaq Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Equity Compensation Plans, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 48,io8, 68 Fed. Reg. 39,995 (July 3, 2003) [hereinafter SEC Equity Compensation Or-
der], which approved exchange-listing rules requiring firms to obtain shareholder approval for
equity-based compensation plans.
10 In an important recent decision, the Delaware Supreme Court examined the scope of share-
holders' power to adopt bylaws under Delaware law, concluding that this power "is limited by the
board's management prerogatives," that the proper function of bylaws is merely "to define
the process and procedures by which [board] decisions are made," and that even process-related
bylaws must leave directors free to disobey the bylaws if the directors conclude that doing so
is necessary to discharge their fiduciary duties. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953
A.2d 227, 232, 235 (Del. 2oo8); see also Corporate Governance After Citizens United Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., & Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., iinth Cong. 1o (2010) (testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law,
Columbia Law School) (arguing that, in light of these developments, Delaware law gives share-
holders "little practical ability to limit or restrict political contributions by mandatory shareholder
action").
We note, however, that the Delaware courts and the courts of other states have not yet ex-
plicitly ruled on the permissibility of bylaws placing limits on a company's political spending.
Thus, state law could conceivably evolve in the future to make such fully binding bylaws permis-
sible. We would welcome such a development, which would be consistent with the proposal we
put forward in section U.A to enable shareholders to pass binding resolutions concerning politi-
cal spending.
11 Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.I4a-8 (2010) (requiring that certain proposals by cer-
tain shareholders be included for a vote in the corporate proxy).
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the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission has allowed
companies to exclude from their proxy statements shareholder propos-
als recommending that the company disclose its lobbying expenses,
concluding that such expenses relate to "ordinary business opera-
tions,"12 but has not allowed firms to exclude proposals requesting dis-
closure of political spending.13  Whether shareholders may use the fed-
eral proxy rules to put forward proposals recommending changes to
the amount or targets of political spending is unclear, but such propos-
als, if included in the proxy and adopted by shareholders, would in
any event be nonbinding. 14
As to the role of independent directors, corporate law rules sepa-
rately require that independent directors oversee certain special types
of decisions, including those related to executive compensation and
auditing of the firm's financial statements. '5 However, under existing
rules, the board is completely free to delegate corporate political
speech decisions to management. And indeed, in practice, public cor-
porations often leave these decisions to management. A recent survey
reported that, among the one hundred largest public companies in
the United States, only thirty-four require board-level approval of po-
litical contributions.16
12 See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 85154o, at *i (Feb. 17,
2009) (concluding that a proposal requesting that the company provide a report related to lobby-
ing activities and expenses could be excluded from the proxy).
13 See, e.g., American International Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 346o68, at
*i (Feb. I9, 2004).
14 We also note that the staff of the SEC has permitted the exclusion of shareholder proposals
recommending that a corporate political action committee be eliminated on the basis of the "ordi-
nary business operations" exception to the shareholder proposals rules. See, e.g., NiSource Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 32072765, at *i (Mar. 22, 2002).
1s See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Release No.
47,654, 17 C.F.R. § 240.ioA-3 (200) (requiring that audit committees consist entirely of indepen-
dent directors); New York Stock Exchange Rule 3 03A.05 (requiring all listed firms to have a com-
pensation committee consisting entirely of independent directors).
16 BRUCE E FREED & JAMIE CARROLL, OPEN WINDOWS: How CODES OF CONDUCT
REGULATE CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING AND A MODEL CODE TO PROTECT COM-
PANY INTERESTS AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE IS & n.i8 (2007), available at http://www.
politicalaccountability.net/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/611. This low figure actually
reflects increased board-level oversight of these decisions; just two years earlier, a similar survey
of 120 large public companies found that just two required board approval of political contribu-
tions. See BRUCE F. FREED ET AL., THE GREEN CANARY: ALERTING SHAREHOLDERS AND
PROTECTING THEIR INVESTMENTS 28-29, 41 app. II (2005), available at http://www.political
accountability.net/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/il920. Moreover, board oversight appears
to be concentrated among the largest public companies, which were the focus of these surveys. A
more recent survey of the entire S&P 500 found that just twenty-two percent of those companies,
or iso firms, had in place board-level oversight of political spending decisions. See Email from
Heidi Welsh, Exec. Dir., Sustainable Invs. Inst., to Robert J. Jackson, Jr. (Sept. 20, 2010, 11:23
EST) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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Finally, as to disclosure, corporate law rules also mandate special
disclosure with respect to some decisions, such as those involving
executive compensation or related-party transactions." However, cor-
porate law rules do not require any special disclosure with respect
to ordinary business decisions - including, under current rules, po-
litical speech decisions. Of course, the aggregate effects of such de-
cisions are reflected in a firm's financial statements, but corporate
law rules do not require a company to separate political spending from
other expenses or to provide shareholders with specific details about
that spending.
C. How Political Speech Decisions Differ
from Ordinary Business Decisions
The latitude that corporate law gives directors and executives to
make ordinary business decisions without any of the safeguards typi-
cally used to protect investors - such as disclosure, required oversight
by independent directors, and shareholder involvement - may well be
warranted. The interests of directors and executives may be suffi-
ciently aligned with those of shareholders with respect to ordinary
business decisions. And even if such decisions occasionally depart
from shareholder interests, these departures are unlikely to be suf-
ficiently common to warrant the introduction of one or more of these
protective mechanisms.
While these protective devices have not been adopted with respect
to ordinary business decisions, they have been adopted with respect to
special types of decisions, such as those concerning executive compen-
sation, the audit of the firm's financial statements, and charter
amendments. In these cases, departures from shareholder interests are
viewed as potentially more common and more significant than in the
case of ordinary business decisions.
Might the existing rules of corporate law - as the Citizens United
Court appeared to suggest' - be adequate for the purpose of protect-
ing shareholders from corporate political speech decisions contrary to
their interests? Or are political speech decisions sufficiently different
from ordinary business decisions that, like certain other types of corpo-
rate decisions, they call for different rules?
17 See 17 C.F.R. § 229 -4 02(b)(2)(i)-(xv) (20Io) (listing fifteen nonexclusive considerations that
may be among the information that firms are required to disclose with respect to executive com-
pensation); id. § 229.404(a) (requiring detailed disclosure on related-party transactions).
18 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (arguing that "[shareholder objections raised through the
procedures of corporate democracy," along with existing disclosure rules, would "permit[] citizens
and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way" (citing First Nat'l
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)))-
892o0o]
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Below we discuss important differences between political speech
decisions and ordinary business decisions that should guide law-
makers' consideration of those questions. We explain that political
speech decisions favored by directors and executives (i) may differ
from those favored by shareholders; (ii) are, based on the limited avail-
able empirical evidence, likely to be of nontrivial financial significance;
and (iii) may have expressive significance for shareholders (and impose
costs on shareholders) beyond their financial effects.
i. Divergence of Interests. - Where the interests of directors and
executives diverge from those of shareholders with sufficient regularity
and magnitude, corporate law rules impose special requirements
designed to address this conflict. For example, existing rules impose
special requirements with respect to decisions related to executive
compensation. 19 As we explain below, the interests of directors and
executives may also diverge frequently and significantly from those of
shareholders with respect to corporate political speech decisions.
To be sure, the interests of directors and executives might be
aligned with those of shareholders with respect to some political
speech decisions. This might be the case, for example, for political
spending aimed at obtaining industry-specific rules that would enable
the company to increase its profits.2 0  There are good reasons to
believe, however, that the interests of directors and executives with re-
spect to political spending often diverge from those of shareholders.
The basic problem arises from the fact that political spending deci-
sions may be a product not merely of a business judgment regarding
the firm's strategy, but also of the directors' and executives' own polit-
ical preferences and beliefs. Political spending might often have con-
sequences that are exogenous to the firm's performance, and directors'
and executives' preferences with respect to such spending might be
influenced by these consequences. Thus, a divergence of interests
may arise with respect to many political issues that corporations may
choose to influence.
Because shareholders generally do not sort themselves among com-
panies according to their political preferences, there is no reason to ex-
pect that the preferences of the particular individuals who make the
company's political speech decisions will match those of shareholders.
19 See, e.g., SEC Equity Compensation Order, supra note 9, at 39,997 (requiring shareholder
approval of equity-based executive pay plans).
20 Because some corporate political spending preferred by directors and executives may also be
consistent with shareholder preferences, shareholder protection objectives would not warrant cor-
porate law rules banning corporate political speech - even if such a ban were constitutionally
permissible. Cf. Sitkoff, supra note 5, at x i16 (arguing that, notwithstanding the possibility that
the interests of managers diverge from those of shareholders with respect to corporate political
spending, lawmakers should consider "less drastic" alternatives than a mandatory prohibition on
such spending).
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Suppose, for example, that the CEO of Company X happens to be a
left-leaning Democrat who hopes to run one day for Congress in a left-
leaning district in the Northeast, and the CEO of Company Y happens
to be a conservative Republican who hopes to run one day for Con-
gress in a conservative district in the South. We have no reason to ex-
pect that the shareholders of each company share their CEO's beliefs
on political issues. Thus, to the extent that corporate political speech
decisions may be significantly influenced by such beliefs, the interests
and preferences of one or both of the CEOs may substantially diverge
from those of each company's shareholders.2 1
One area in which directors and executives may be particularly
likely to have views divergent from those of shareholders involves
rules concerning corporate governance and shareholder rights. Man-
agement may use corporate resources to lobby against expansion of
shareholder rights that shareholders favor. For example, when the
SEC recently considered whether shareholders should be given access
to the corporate proxy for the election of directors, companies general-
ly opposed the proposal while institutional investors generally ex-
pressed support for it (though to significantly varying degrees). 2 2 In-
deed, because corporate political spending can be expected to affect
corporate governance rules in general, a failure to address agency
problems related to corporate political speech decisions may make it
more difficult in the future to address agency problems with respect to
other corporate decisions. 23
Of course, it may be argued that directors and executives will be
deterred from departing from shareholder interests with respect to
corporate political speech decisions by markets, including the markets
for corporate control, products, and capital.2 4 Furthermore, it may be
argued that, even if directors and executives were not deterred from
21 While we focus in this Comment on political speech decisions, our reasoning may also apply
to similar corporate decisions, such as decisions to spend corporate funds on charitable contribu-
tions. Relative to the ordinary business decisions with which they are now conflated, those deci-
sions may also involve more frequent or significant divergence between the interests of directors
and executives and those of shareholders. Accordingly, our analysis may also justify a reconsid-
eration of the rules governing public companies' decisions concerning charitable contributions.
See infra note 97.
22 Compare Letter from Wayne Watts, Senior Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel, AT&T, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-Io-o9/s7loo9-
62 9 .pdf, with Letter from Jack Ehnes, CEO, Cal. State Teachers' Ret. Sys., to Elizabeth M. Mur-
phy, Sec'y, SEC (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-Io-og/s7ioog-623.pdf. See gen-
erally Comments on Proposed Rule: Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations: File No. S7-
to-op, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s7 iooo.shtml#33-9086.
23 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman, Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics,
23 REv. FIN. STUD. 1o8g, 1113 (2010) (developing an account of interest group politics in which
corporate insiders' ability to use corporate assets to lobby politicians leads to a suboptimal equi-
librium level of investor protection).
24 See, e.g., Sitkoff, supra note 5, at I114-18.
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pursuing political speech contrary to shareholder wishes, shareholders
would be protected by share prices that, ex ante, reflect the possibility
of such a divergence of interest.
These generic objections may be raised with respect to any rules
seeking to address a potential divergence of interest regarding any type
of corporate decision. The responses to these objections are well de-
veloped in the literature, and have been presented in detail in other
work by one of us. 2 5 To the extent that one supports the mechanisms
established by corporate law rules for various situations involving a
divergence of the interests of directors and executives from those of
shareholders, and therefore is not prepared to rely simply on market
forces to eradicate these problems, one should also be reluctant to rely
on market forces to eliminate any similar divergence of interests with
respect to political speech decisions. 26
In the case of corporate political spending, it may be argued that
firms will also be restrained by another factor - namely, the risk of
retaliation by those outraged by the corporation's political spending.
Those advancing this argument might point to the recent example of
the Target Corporation, which faced a customer boycott after it was
revealed that the firm had donated $150,000 to a political group that
25 See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 53-58 (2004) (explaining how mar-
ket forces cannot fully eliminate problems resulting from a divergence between the interests of
directors and executives and those of shareholders with respect to executive compensation deci-
sions); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 1o HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1470-75 (1992) (providing such an anal-
ysis with respect to reincorporation decisions); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Free-
dom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1820, 184o-46 (1989) (providing such an analysis with respect to decisions to initiate charter
amendments). For an early work recognizing the limits of market forces in fully addressing prob-
lems resulting from interest divergence of this kind, see generally MELVIN ARON EISENBERG,
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1976).
26 Existing empirical work on the frequency with which, and the extent to which, the interests
of directors and executives with respect to political spending actually diverge from the interests of
shareholders is limited. Recent research provides some empirical evidence consistent with the
possibility that corporate political spending is associated with agency problems. See Rajesh K.
Aggarwal et al., Corporate Political Contributions: Investment or Agency? 1-2, 17-18, 49-50 tbl.4
(June 25, 2oo9) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=972670 (providing some evidence that
U.S. firms making larger political contributions have lower returns); John C. Coates, IV, Corpo-
rate Governance and Corporate Political Activity: What Effect Will Citizens United Have on
Shareholder Wealth? 13-14, 24-25 tbls. 3, 4 (Sept. 21, 20o0) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstractid=168o86i.
More than two decades ago, Professor Roberta Romano claimed that "casual" empiricism suggests
that corporate political spending is profit-maximizing, but did not carry out an empirical study of
the subject. See Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV.
923, 995-96 (1984). Further empirical work is warranted, and we hope that future research will
shed further light on this important issue.
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backed a gubernatorial candidate opposed to same-sex marriage. 27
However, while the fear of such backlash might restrain corporate po-
litical spending not favored by shareholders in some circumstances, it
cannot be expected to do so in general. For one thing, a substantial
amount of such speech will likely be unrelated to social issues of the
type that triggered public backlash in the Target case. For another, as
we explain below, existing laws permit corporate political spending to
be channeled through intermediaries in a manner that obscures the
source and magnitude of the funds, and companies doing so will have
little reason to fear such a backlash.
2. Financial Significance. - It might be argued that, even ac-
cepting that the interests of directors and executives may diverge from
those of shareholders, the problem is not of financial significance. On
this view, even if directors and executives engage in political spending
that is inconsistent with shareholder interests, the financial implica-
tions of those decisions are not sufficiently substantial to warrant spe-
cial treatment for those decisions. Is there a basis, opponents of such
treatment may ask, for believing that public corporations have been
expending substantial amounts of corporate resources? As we explain
below, the answer is yes.
To begin, even prior to Citizens United, public corporations have
been permitted to provide indirect funding to political causes through
intermediaries. Public disclosures do not permit us to obtain precise
figures for such political spending for particular corporations. But the
existing data do suggest that the amounts may be substantial.
Table i below provides data we assembled from public filings de-
scribing the amounts spent on lobbying and political expenditures dur-
ing 2008 by five large intermediaries. Two of them (the Chamber of
Commerce and the Business Roundtable) seek to advance the interests
of businesses across all of the economy's sectors, and three (the Ameri-
can Petroleum Institute, the Financial Services Roundtable, and the
National Association of Manufacturers) seek to do so for firms in par-
ticular industries. Three of the five spent more than 40% of the total
funds they raised to finance lobbying and political expenditures. To-
gether, these five organizations spent more than $130 million on lobby-
ing and politics in 2008 alone.
27 Brody Mullins & Ann Zimmerman, Target Discovers Downside to Political Contributions,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 7-8, 2010, at A2.
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TABLE I. FUNDRAISING AND SPENDING BY INTERMEDIARIES 28
Percentage of Total
Lobbying Funds Raised by
and Political Each Intermediary
Expenditures Spent on Lobbying
and Politics
United States Chamber of Commerce $63.1 million 42.8%
American Petroleum Institute $42.3 million 13.2%
Business Roundtable $13.3 million 62.4%
Financial Services Roundtable $7.6 million 42.3%
National Association of Manufacturers
of the United States of America $7.5 million 18.2%
Of course, the figures above are underinclusive insofar as they do
not include many other intermediaries through which public corpora-
tions may channel political spending.29 These figures may also be
overinclusive, however, as current disclosure rules do not require in-
termediaries to disaggregate - and intermediaries do not voluntarily
disaggregate - lobbying and political expenses. These rules also do
not require the intermediaries, or public corporations supporting them,
to indicate how much was provided by a particular corporation - an
28 The data in Table i were assembled from each intermediary's IRS Form 990, which is made
publicly available by organizations seeking to track intermediary spending. See, e.g., About Us,
GUIDESTAR, http://www2.guidestar.org/rxglabout-us/index.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2010) (de-
scribing the mission of one such organization as including efforts to "encourage nonprofits to
share information about their organizations openly and completely"). Each organization's lobby-
ing and political expenditures were drawn from line 2a of Part III-B of Schedule C to Form 99o,
which requires disclosure of lobbying and political expenses. See Am. Petroleum Inst., IRS Form
99o, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2008); Bus. Round-
table, IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047)
(2oo8); Fin. Servs. Roundtable, IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax
(OMB No. 1545-oo47) (2oo8); Nat'l Assoc. of Mfrs., IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Ex-
empt from Income Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2008); U.S. Chamber of Commerce, IRS Form 990,
Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2oo8). The percentages
reflect the quotient of these figures and each organization's gross receipts, which are drawn from
line G of Form 990.
29 Microsoft and News Corporation are two high-profile examples in which corporate political
spending was revealed to have been channeled through intermediaries. Microsoft provided over
$250,000 to the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which in turn funded advertisements regarding
the Michigan Senate race in 2ooo, and was reported to have spent nearly $16 million in total on
lobbying and political expenses between 1997 and 2000. See John R. Wilke, Microsoft Is Source
of 'Soft Money' Funds Behind Ads in Michigan's Senate Race, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2ooo, at A3.
News Corporation contributed $i million to the Republican Governors' Association in 2010. See
Brody Mullins, Groups' Spending for GOP on Rise, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2oo, at Ai.
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issue that the disclosure requirements we propose in section III.D are
designed to address.30
Furthermore, the relatively new freedom to spend corporate funds
in connection with elections may produce a material increase in corpo-
rate spending related to politics. Such an increase may result from the
use of corporate funds to replace, sometimes several times over,
amounts now spent by corporate political action committees (PACs).
While public corporations have been precluded from spending corpo-
rate funds on elections, they have been permitted to sponsor PACs that
raise funds from executives and other employees to engage in political
spending, and many corporations sponsor PACs that spend substantial
amounts. For example, the PACs of AT&T and Honeywell Interna-
tional contributed $3.1 million and $2.5 million, respectively, to candi-
dates for federal office in the 2007-2oo8 election cycle.31 During that
cycle, business PACs are collectively estimated to have spent over $300
million at the national level alone. 32
The funds provided by corporate PACs come from the personal
wealth of executives and other employees, not from corporate trea-
suries. With companies now permitted to spend corporate funds on
indirect support of candidates, executives may prefer to replace some
of the amounts spent by corporate PACs with spending from corporate
treasuries, since the costs of the latter type of spending are to a sub-
stantial extent borne by shareholders. Alternatively, executives may
supplement PAC funds, which may be used for direct support of can-
didates, with corporate political spending designed to provide indirect
support. In either case, the fact that executives were willing to spend
substantial amounts of their personal funds on political speech sug-
gests that they will be willing to spend even more corporate funds to
advance such causes.
3. Expressive Significance. - The above discussion indicates that
the financial stakes of corporate political speech are hardly trivial for
public corporations and their shareholders. In assessing the agency
30 Our analysis focuses on well-known intermediaries. Recent reports, however, have high-
lighted the existence of some obscure intermediaries that spend millions of dollars on indirect
support for candidates. See Mike McIntire, Under Tax-Exempt Cloak, Political Dollars Flow,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, at Ai. For the reasons given above, it is impossible to discern the
extent to which public corporations provide support for these organizations and, if so, how much
support is provided by any particular corporation.
31 See Top PACs, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/toppacs
.php?Type=C&cycle=2oo8 (last visited Oct. 2, 2010).
32 This estimate is drawn from a database maintained by the Center for Responsive Politics,
which assigns each PAC included in Federal Election Commission filings to one of thirteen sec-
tors. The figure includes PACs assigned to sectors relating to particular industries, but excludes
PACs assigned to the "Ideological/Single-Issue," "Labor," and "Other" sectors. See Email from
Spencer MacColl, Ctr. for Responsive Politics, to authors (Sept. 20, 2010, 12:04 AST) (on file with
the Harvard Law School Library).
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costs related to these decisions, it is important not to limit our atten-
tion to the financial stakes. The costs of political speech decisions that
depart from shareholder interests are not limited to the financial costs
incurred by the company. Accordingly, these costs are not limited to
whatever adverse effects those costs may have on the corporation's
profits or stock returns.33
In particular, shareholders may attach expressive significance to
corporate political speech that goes far beyond the amount spent.
Shareholders may have an interest in not being associated with politi-
cal speech that they do not support, and this interest is not properly
measured by the amount of the firm's political spending. Suppose,
for example, that a corporation's CEO spent a financially trivial
amount on an advertisement on the company's behalf expressing
support for a political position that most of the shareholders loathe.
While the shareholders may be practically indifferent to an ordinary
business decision with similar financial costs, they might feel different-
ly about spending on the advertisement that associates their company
- and, indirectly, the shareholders themselves - with such a political
position.
The SEC has long recognized that shareholders may have an inter-
est in social policy issues that goes beyond the issues' direct financial
relevance. Federal securities rules do not require directors and execu-
tives to include on the corporate proxy a shareholder proposal that
"deals with a matter relating to the company's ordinary business oper-
ations."3 4  However, recognizing the "depth of interest among share-
holders in having an opportunity to express their views" on social is-
sues, the SEC has concluded that the "ordinary business" exclusion
should not apply to precatory shareholder proposals related to such so-
cial issues.35 Thus, for example, the SEC has concluded that share-
holder proposals requesting that the firm create a policy regarding in-
vestments in nations with serious human rights violations must be
included on the corporate proxy, even when the company has few such
investments.3 6 Indeed, the SEC has expressly identified political con-
33 Nevertheless, the costs of special decisional rules may sometimes exceed the benefits
to shareholders, even when considering the expressive significance of corporate political speech
decisions. For that reason, we suggest that lawmakers provide shareholders with the ability to
opt out of any such rules, provided that certain procedural protections are observed. See infra
section III.C, pp. 102-04.
34 Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(iX7) (20o9).
35 Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,1o6, 29,io8 (May 28,
1998).
36 See, e.g., Unocal Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL o6i12 (Mar. xx, 1996); Gillette
Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 8089 (Jan. 4, 1996). The Commission had previously con-
cluded that shareholder proposals of this type could be excluded from the proxy; but, noting that
"[n]early all commentators from the shareholder community who addressed the matter supported
the reversal of this position," the Commission concluded that "proposals that raise significant so-
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tributions as an example of the "ethical issues" that "may be significant
to the issuer's business, even though such significance is not apparent
from an economic viewpoint."37
m. ALIGNING POLITICAL SPEECH DECISIONS
WITH SHAREHOLDER INTERESTS
We turn in this Part to an examination of how special rules should
be designed to address the divergence between the interests of direc-
tors and executives and those of shareholders with respect to corporate
political speech decisions. In the course of our analysis, we comment
on legislative proposals considered by Congress in the wake of Citizens
United.35  We consider in turn four elements of governance rules that
could be used to address agency problems arising in connection with
corporate political speech decisions: the role of shareholders (section
A); the role of directors (section B); procedures that permit sharehold-
ers to opt out of lawmakers' chosen default arrangements (section C);
and disclosure, with an emphasis on disclosure of indirect contribu-
tions through "conduit" entities (section D).3 9  In section E, we consid-
er the constitutionality of these proposed rules.
A. Shareholders
i. Role. - As previously noted, although prevailing corporate law
rules do not allow shareholders to provide direct input into ordinary
business decisions, they do require shareholder approval for certain
cial policy issues" could no longer necessarily be excluded pursuant to the "ordinary business" ex-
ception. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 63 Fed. Reg. at 29,108.
37 Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release
No. 12999, 1o SEC Docket ioo6 (Nov. 22, 1976).
38 One such proposal passed the House of Representatives in June 2010. See Democracy Is
Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act (DISCLOSE Act), H.R. 5175, i1ith
Cong. (2010). It appears, however, that this proposal will not pass during the iiith Congress.
See Eric Lichtblau & Carl Hulse, Senate Democrats Fail to Advance a Campaign Finance Bill, an
Obama Priority, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2oo, at A'7. Other proposals are currently pending be-
fore Congress, including one passed by the House Financial Services Committee. See Shareholder
Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4790, Iith Cong. (2010).
39 Some opponents of these proposals may argue that firms should be expected to adopt these
arrangements voluntarily if they are beneficial to investors - and thus that the existing set of
corporate law rules must be optimal. This argument, sometimes referred to as the "Panglossian"
view, can be offered in response to any proposal that introduces corporate governance rules that
do not already prevail in the marketplace. For responses to these Panglossian arguments, see, for
example, Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
833, 888-91 (2005). We also note that, other than the disclosure requirements, described in section
III.D, the corporate law arrangements described in this Part are proposed as default arrange-
ments from which shareholders may opt out. Thus, these arrangements can be expected to sur-
vive in the marketplace only if they enjoy the support of a majority of shareholders. See infra
section M.C, pp. 102-04.
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other corporate decisions.40 Because of the significant likelihood that
the interests of directors and executives will diverge with respect to
political speech decisions, lawmakers should also require shareholder
approval for corporate political spending.
We therefore favor a default corporate law arrangement that, inter
alia, provides shareholders with a veto over the overall amount of cor-
porate resources spent on political speech. 4 1 This rule might specify
that in any given year political spending may exceed a certain mini-
mum threshold only up to the level authorized by a shareholder resolu-
tion in the preceding annual meeting. For this purpose, political
spending should include both amounts spent directly and amounts
spent indirectly through intermediaries. One proposal introduced in
Congress following the decision in Citizens United would require
shareholder approval for political expenditures exceeding $5o,ooo at
U.S. public companies.42
While a requirement that shareholders approve a budget for politi-
cal spending would be novel in the United States, companies in the
United Kingdom have been subject to such a requirement for over a
decade. Under British law, shareholders must consent, by majority
vote on a shareholder resolution, to any political spending that exceeds
5000.43  Although data regarding British corporations' spending on
political speech are incomplete, they suggest that spending fell follow-
ing the adoption of this legislation.44 For example, one study indicated
that twenty-eight large British firms donated £so,000 or more between
1987 and 1988, but between 2oo and 2009 none of these firms do-
40 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
41 Although not the basis for our analysis or conclusions, we note that there is some survey
evidence suggesting that adoption of this approach would be well received by the public. See
STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & NATHANIEL PERSILY, KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS, FIELD RE-
PORT. CONSTITUTIONAL ATTITUDES SURVEY IGi Q5,5 (20o0), available at http://www.law.
columbia.edu/null/download?&exclusive=filemgr.download&file-id=54767 (reporting that in re-
sponse to the question, "Should corporations be required to get approval from their shareholders
for expenditures related to political campaigns?", 84.5% of those polled answered "Yes").
42 See Shareholder Protection Act of 20o0, H.R. 4790 § 4(a).
43 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, c. 41, H§ 139-40 (U.K.). While
shareholder rights in the United Kingdom and other common law countries are generally stronger
than those in the United States, the annual shareholder approval requirement with respect to po-
litical spending is unique among U.K. shareholders' voting rights. See generally Paul L. Davies,
The United Kingdom, in SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS AND PRACTICES IN EUROPE AND
THE UNITED STATES 331, 331-52 (T. Baums & E. Wymeersch eds., 1999) (describing the limited
use of shareholder meetings and resolutions in the United Kingdom).
44 See, e.g., CIARA TORRES-SPELLIScY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CORPORATE
CAMPAIGN SPENDING: GIVING SHAREHOLDERS A VOICE 18 (2oo), available at http://
brennan.3cdn.net/54a676e481fogbfb8_bvm6ivakn.pdf.
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nated more than E1500.45 Aggregate corporate contributions, too, ap-
pear to have declined since the adoption of the legislation.4 1
In our view, however, subjecting the total level of expenditures to
shareholder approval would not by itself ensure that corporate politi-
cal speech decisions are consistent with shareholder interests. Share-
holders may have interests that differ from those of directors and ex-
ecutives not only with respect to the total amount spent on politics, but
also with respect to how that spending is targeted.
Some might argue that shareholders' power to veto the budget in
future years is enough to deter directors and executives from spending
this year's budget in a manner contrary to shareholder preferences.
But it may be in shareholders' interests to approve a budget even if
some of management's political spending is contrary to shareholder in-
terests. Thus, giving shareholders a veto over the budget, without any
say over targeting, may unnecessarily require them to choose between
having no political spending at all or having a budget spent, in part, in
accordance with directors' and managers' preferences rather than
their own. Such a limited choice may produce an outcome that falls
substantially short of the one most preferred by shareholders.
Accordingly, we also propose that shareholders be permitted to
adopt binding resolutions concerning corporate political spending.
Providing shareholders with the power to adopt such binding resolu-
tions would require a change in current rules, which permit share-
holders to adopt binding bylaws with respect to some governance is-
sues but not with respect to ordinary business decisions - which, as
we have discussed, currently include political speech decisions.47 Such
resolutions on political spending could apply either for a given year or
until replaced by a subsequent resolution. For example, shareholders
could direct that the corporation may not spend funds for certain types
of political purposes (such as judicial campaigns or the election of a
particular candidate) or that the corporation must follow certain prin-
ciples in allocating any authorized budget for political spending.
45 See id. at 18, 37 n.78 (citing Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, Trends in British Party Funding
1913-1987, 42 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 197, 2io (1989); Register of Donations to Political Parties,
ELECTORAL COMM'N, http://registers.electoralcommission.org.uk/regulatory-issues/regdpolitical
parties.cfm (last visited Oct. 2, 2010)).
46 As noted in the text, data on British corporations' contributions are incomplete and limited,
and it is difficult to draw conclusions about the relationship between these rules and aggregate
corporate contributions. However, the data indicate that overall contributions to the Conserva-
tive Party, which receives the bulk of corporate donations, fell from E2.88 million for fiscal year
1997-1998, before these rules were adopted, to £I-74 million in 2oor and £s.s6 million in 2oo3.
Id. at 18; see also Register of Donations to Political Parties, supra note 45 (providing data on cor-
porate contributions to the Conservative Party after 2000).
47 See, e.g., CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234-36 (Del. 2008) (de-
scribing the types of bylaws that shareholders may, and may not, adopt under Delaware law).
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The power to adopt such resolutions will make it more likely that
both the firm's budget for political spending and the chosen targets
will be consistent with shareholder interests. And, as a practical mat-
ter, this power will give shareholders an alternative to merely approv-
ing management's proposed budget for political spending. Finally,
even if shareholders' power to pass such binding resolutions is used
only rarely, its existence would improve the incentives of directors and
executives to target the corporation's political spending in ways consis-
tent with shareholder interests.
2. Objections. - Requiring shareholder voting on corporate politi-
cal spending may be opposed on grounds of the general objection -
equally applicable to shareholder voting on compensation issues, merg-
ers, and charter amendments - that shareholders' ability to replace
directors is, standing alone, enough to prevent the firm's decisions
from diverging from shareholder interests. 48 Shareholders displeased
with the company's political spending, it may be argued, could vote in
favor of challengers seeking to replace incumbent directors, and the
prospect of such a proxy fight can be expected to deter directors from
making decisions contrary to shareholder interests.
However, given existing rules of corporate law that impose substan-
tial impediments to proxy fights,4 9 the threat of an election contest can
hardly be relied upon to ensure that corporate political spending does
not diverge significantly from shareholder interests. Furthermore,
when shareholders prefer that the company not engage in political
spending but are otherwise satisfied with incumbent directors' man-
agement of the firm, there are substantial advantages to allowing
shareholders to veto the political spending decision directly, rather
than requiring shareholders to bundle that decision with their overall
assessment of the directors' performance.s0
Opponents of shareholder voting on corporate political speech may
also raise a second generic objection - which, again, is equally appli-
cable to matters on which shareholders already have approval rights
- namely, that imperfectly informed shareholders are best served by
having better-informed directors and executives make decisions for
48 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to
Bebchuk's Solution for Improving Corporate America, I19 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1762 (2006).
49 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Essay, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675,
688-94 (2007) (discussing the various impediments that make it costly and difficult for sharehold-
ers to replace incumbent directors). The SEC has recently promulgated rules that would permit
certain shareholders to place a limited number of candidates on the corporate ballot. See Facili-
tating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, and 249).
so Cf. Bebchuk, supra note 39, at 856-61 (arguing that shareholder power to replace directors
does not obviate the need for shareholders to have the power to make "rules-of-the-game"
decisions).
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them.5  But requiring shareholder approval does not necessarily result
in shareholders' substituting their judgments for those of directors and
executives. Shareholders can and often do defer to insiders' decisions,
and insiders have the opportunity to explain the basis for their views
to shareholders. However, where shareholders decide, after weighing
those considerations, that they prefer to limit insiders' control over po-
litical spending, they should be able to do so.52
Finally, introducing shareholder voting may be opposed on grounds
that it would produce wasteful transaction costs. In assessing this ob-
jection, however, it should be noted that the proposed shareholder vot-
ing would take advantage of shareholder votes that would be cast any-
way. In connection with each annual meeting, shareholders mark their
preferences on many issues on the corporation's proxy card. Thus, our
proposal would merely involve marking additional preferences on a
ballot that shareholders would send in any event.
B. Independent Directors
Ordinary business decisions - which, under current law, include
political speech decisions - are commonly delegated to, and made by,
the corporation's executives. However, as previously noted, existing
corporate law arrangements require the board - and in particular its
independent directors - to take an active role in overseeing certain
special types of decisions.53  Whether or not lawmakers introduce
shareholder voting with respect to corporate political speech determi-
nations, they should require independent directors to play a role in
such decisions. 54
As we have explained, the interests of directors and executives re-
garding corporate political speech may often diverge from those of
shareholders. While there is substantial debate over the efficacy of in-
s See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, iig
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1745-46 (2006).
52 Cf Bebchuk, supra note 39, at 894-95 (suggesting that when shareholders decide not to
defer to directors, letting shareholders overrule management may maximize expected shareholder
value).
53 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
54 We note that, after Citizens United, Iowa law was amended to require that a majority of the
board approve such expenditures, and that the board give its approval in the same year as those
expenditures are made. See S. 2354, 83 d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. § 3 (Iowa 2010) (amending
IOWA CODE § 68A.4o4 (Supp. 2009)). In addition, at least two states, Louisiana and Missouri,
had already required that corporate political expenditures be expressly approved by the board of
directors or a designee. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:505.2(F) (2oo4 & Supp. 2010); MO. REV.
STAT. § 130.029.1(1) (2000). However, only a small percentage of public companies in the United
States are incorporated in (and, thus, subject to the rules of) one of these three states. See Lucian
Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 391
tbl.2 (2003) (documenting the distribution of incorporations for U.S. public companies among the
fifty states and the District of Columbia).
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dependent directors as representatives of shareholder interests, 5 s inde-
pendent-director oversight is especially useful in cases, like corporate
political speech decisions, where operational expertise possessed by in-
siders but not by independent directors may not be needed to evaluate
the company's alternatives. And, in cases where operational expertise
might be relevant, the judgment of the independent directors could be
informed by - but not beholden to - the views of management.
Accordingly, we support rules requiring corporate speech decisions
to be approved, or at least overseen, by a committee of independent
directors. Boards should not be required to establish a separate com-
mittee for this purpose; instead, boards could authorize one of the
other committees staffed solely by independent directors, such as the
corporate governance and nominating committee required by existing
corporate law rules, to fulfill this role. The committee could be re-
quired to include in each year's proxy statement a discussion of
its work and an explanation of the choices it made during the preced-
ing year.
Our approach, which favors vesting oversight and responsibility for
corporate speech decisions in independent directors rather than execu-
tives, differs from the approach taken by the drafters of some propos-
als introduced in Congress in the wake of Citizens United. One such
proposal, for example, would have required the chief executive officer
or a designee to certify, among other things, that the corporation has
provided an accurate report regarding its political spending to federal
regulators.5 6 While such a requirement may have some beneficial
effects, we believe that corporate law rules should vest responsibility
for corporate political spending in independent directors rather than
executives.5
C. Private Ordering
i. Opting Out Procedures. - In addition to considering the role of
shareholders and directors with respect to corporate political speech
decisions, lawmakers should also consider whether - and, if so, in
what way - companies should be able to opt out of lawmakers' cho-
ss For different perspectives on the effectiveness of independent directors, compare Victor
Brudney, The Independent Director - Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV.
597, 658 (1982), with Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, Essay, The Active Board of Directors
and Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1291-92
(1998).
56 See DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175, iusth Cong. § 212(c) (2010).
57 In contrast to the DISCLOSE Act, id., the Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4790,
iiith Cong. (2oo), would require the national securities exchanges to adopt a rule requiring all
listed firms to include in their bylaws a requirement that directors must vote on any political ex-
penditure exceeding $5o,ooo. Firms would also be required to make the individual votes of each
director public within 48 hours of the vote. See id. § 4.
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sen default arrangements. While many corporate law rules are manda-
tory - such as those requiring shareholder approval for mergers and
charter amendments, and those requiring independent-director over-
sight of compensation and audit decisions - other corporate law rules
permit shareholders to opt out. With respect to the role of sharehold-
ers and independent directors, we favor permitting shareholders to opt
out of the default arrangement - so long as appropriate rules, dis-
cussed below, ensure that any opting out is consistent with shareholder
interests.
Giving shareholders the ability to opt out should make lawmakers
comfortable adopting default arrangements that include substantial
safeguards such as those discussed in the preceding sections of this
Part. To begin, permitting shareholders to opt out should strengthen
the case for the constitutional permissibility of such rules, because
rules that permit opting out burden corporate speech only to the extent
that such rules enjoy the support of a majority of shareholders. Fur-
thermore, permitting opting out should allay any concerns that the
chosen default arrangements would require companies to be subject to
rules that are not in shareholders' interests. In such a case, directors
would be expected to initiate, and shareholders to approve, opting out
of the default arrangements.
What rules should govern the process of opting out? Three fea-
tures are, in our view, important. First, shareholders should be free to
opt out of lawmakers' chosen default arrangements in both directions.
For example, shareholders should be permitted to raise the majority of
shareholders whose approval is needed to approve political spending
(for example, to sixty percent), but they also should be free to waive
the requirement for shareholder approval.
Second, to ensure that the corporation is governed by arrangements
consistent with shareholder interests, any opting out should require
shareholder approval, and shareholders should have the power to ini-
tiate such a vote. While the rules should permit the board to initiate
opting out and bring that proposal to a shareholder vote, the board
should not be able to effect an opt-out (and particularly not an opt-out
that weakens shareholder protections) unilaterally, nor make it more
difficult for shareholders to effect an opt-out.
Third, the rules should provide that shareholder decisions to opt
out of the chosen default arrangement sunset after a specified period of
time, say, five years. Such a sunset provision would ensure that opting
out continues to enjoy shareholder support.
2. Opting Out vs. Opting In. - In light of the ability of sharehold-
ers to opt in and out of the default arrangements we propose, some
may argue that lawmakers should retain the existing corporate law
rules - which subject corporate political speech decisions to the same
rules as ordinary business decisions - and simply allow shareholders
to opt in to different arrangements, such as those we propose. Howev-
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er, lawmakers must take into account a substantial asymmetry that ex-
ists between default rules that provide shareholders with protective ar-
rangements and rules that merely permit shareholders to opt in to such
arrangements. When a default corporate law rule is inefficient, opting
out of it is much more likely to happen when directors and boards fa-
vor an opt-out than when shareholders favor one.58
Accordingly, lawmakers should not rely on shareholders' ability, on
their own, to enact rules providing shareholders and independent di-
rectors a role in corporate political speech decisions. As emphasized in
work co-authored by one of us,5 9 in designing these rules lawmakers
should instead use the approach of reversible defaults - that is, take
into account which default rule is practically easier to reverse. This
consideration favors default rules that provide a role for shareholders
and independent directors with respect to corporate political speech
decisions - but permitting shareholders to opt out of those rules.60
D. Disclosure Requirements
Corporate law rules generally do not require public firms to pro-
vide their shareholders with disclosure regarding ordinary business de-
cisions. However, as we have previously noted, public firms are re-
quired to provide their shareholders with detailed disclosure with
respect to certain specified types of decisions. 61 Public corporations
should similarly be required to make detailed disclosures concerning
political spending, including robust and effective disclosure of spend-
ing via intermediaries.
Whatever lawmakers choose to do with respect to the roles of
shareholders and independent directors in corporate political speech
decisions, effective disclosure to shareholders is necessary. If, as we
propose, shareholders are permitted to vote on these matters, they will
need such information in order to cast informed votes. If shareholders
are not to be provided with a vote, and instead must rely on voting in
director elections to discourage political speech they disfavor, they
5 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolu-
tion, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 489, 490-91 (2002) (identifying this asymmetry); Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65 BUS. LAW. 329, 345 (201o) (arguing
that, because of the asymmetry, it is desirable for the SEC to provide a default proxy access ar-
rangement rather than merely enabling shareholders to opt in to it from a no-access default).
59 Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 58, at 492-93 (putting forward the "reversible defaults"
strategy).
60 We also note that a poll of U.S. public company shareholders conducted before Citizens
United was decided reported that a majority of shareholders do not believe that existing law pro-
vides sufficient checks on directors and executives with respect to corporate political spending.
See MASON-DIXON POLLING & RESEARCH & THE CTR. FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY,
CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING: A SURVEY OF AMERICAN SHAREHOLDERS 9 (2006).
61 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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must know enough about the company's political speech to inform
their votes on directors. Effective disclosure should be supported even
by those who are fully content with the existing "procedures of corpo-
rate democracy" under corporate law rules, as such procedures cannot
be expected to have a meaningful impact on political speech decisions
if shareholders are uninformed about the corporation's political spend-
ing. Below, we discuss what information should be provided to public
investors for disclosure of corporate political spending to be effective.
At first glance, one might conclude that significant information
about political spending is already available in the public domain.
Disclosure rules already exist in the United Kingdom, where all public
companies are required to include in the annual directors' report the
amounts of the company's individual donations over a threshold
amount and the identity of the recipient of each such donation.62 In
U.S. companies, precatory shareholder proposals recommending disclo-
sure of political spending have increasingly gained support from
shareholders,'6 3 and some U.S. firms have decided voluntarily to pro-
vide disclosure with respect to political spending. 64 Moreover, existing
law, such as regulations promulgated by the Federal Election Commis-
sion, require detailed disclosure with respect to political spending, 65 al-
though these rules are designed to provide the public with information
regarding the source of funds for particular politicians - not to ad-
dress agency problems within the corporate entities providing the
funding. 66 Despite these existing rules and practices, however, for two
reasons substantial additional disclosure is needed to provide share-
holders of public corporations with adequate information about the
corporation's political spending.
First, some information that is critical for assessing any particular
public corporation's political spending is simply not in the public do-
main. In particular, as we have noted, it appears that corporations
make significant contributions to intermediary entities that spend sub-
62 See Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, c. 41, § 140 (U.K.).
63 See, e.g., Investors Consider Climate, Other Risk in Busy Season, CORP. SOC. ISSUES REP.,
June/July 2008, at I; THE CONFERENCE BOARD, HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE POLITICAL
ACTIVITY (forthcoming Oct. 2oo) (manuscript at 31) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).
64 See, e.g., Medtronic Medical Technology Fund: FY 2010 Contributions, MEDTRONIC,
http://www.medtronic.com/wcm/groups/mdtcom-sg@mdt/@ap/@au/@corp/documents/document
fyi i-contributions.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2010).
65 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1), (4) (2oo6 & Supp. m 2009) (requiring reporting for persons
whose political speech expenditures exceed $io,ooo in the aggregate annually).
66 See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003) (noting that Congress designed FEC
disclosure requirements to require those funding political advertisements "to reveal their identities
so that the public is able to identify the source of the funding" (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F.
Supp. 2d 176, 237 (D.D.C. 2003))), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United, 13o S. Ct. 876.
2o0o] 1o5
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
stantial sums on politics,67 but these intermediaries are not required to
disclose the identities of the public corporations contributing to them
- or the amounts each corporation contributed. As a result, there is
generally no information in the public domain regarding how much of
each intermediary's funds, if any, was provided by a particular public
corporation. With little information available to the public, organiza-
tions attempting to monitor political spending resort to speculation
that corporations with executives on the boards of an intermediary are
likely to be a source of some funding for that intermediary - but still
cannot know how much funding, if any, that corporation provides.68
Second, even information already required to be disclosed under
existing rules is not provided in a manner that makes it feasible for
shareholders to understand the amounts and beneficiaries of a public
corporation's political spending. As we have discussed, this informa-
tion is often included separately in disclosures to the Federal Election
Commission, various tax filings, and other public sources of informa-
tion. Public investors interested in this information should not have to
bear the costs of assembling it from these sources. The corporation,
rather than individual investors, is in the best position to put together
the needed information in a cost-effective way. Accordingly, public
corporations should be required to provide shareholders with frequent-
ly updated information about the total amounts spent on political
speech, as well as the identity of each recipient that receives amounts
over a certain threshold from the company.
For these disclosure rules to be effective, they must also include
look-through requirements for indirect political spending.69 Suppose,
for example, that a public company elects not to spend on political
causes directly but rather to provide $X to an intermediary organiza-
tion that pools the $X with some other funds for spending on political
causes. To be able to assess whether the $X in contributions was in
their interests, shareholders need to know more than the mere fact that
the corporation gave to the intermediary - they also need to know
how the total pool of funds put together by the intermediary is spent.
To facilitate the necessary disclosure by corporations, these inter-
mediaries should be required to provide contributors with information
concerning the targets to which their contributions are directed. If an
67 See supra Table 1, p. 94.
68 See, e.g., CTR. FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, POLITICAL TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY PROFILE, CATERPILLAR, INC. 3 (2009) (noting that Caterpillar's CEO is a
member of the Business Roundtable, and the Caterpillar Group President serves on the board of
the United States Chamber of Commerce).
69 We note that lawmakers have previously recognized the importance of contributions made
through intermediaries or conduits. The Federal Elections Campaign Act imposes criminal penal-
ties for those who "knowing[ly] and willful[ly]" violate contribution limits through such interme-
diaries. 2 U.S.C. § 437g (2006 & Supp. M 2oo9).
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intermediary organization receives funds that are earmarked for a par-
ticular political purpose, such reporting would be straightforward.
And if the funds are not earmarked, then the intermediary organiza-
tion would simply need to record how its total pool of unrestricted
funds was spent on political causes, and then report to its contributors,
including corporations, their prorated spending on each political cause.
Public companies would then be able to disclose to shareholders any
political cause for which they provide support - either directly or in-
directly through intermediary organizations - that exceeds a certain
threshold level.70
While bills introduced in Congress in the immediate wake of Citi-
zens United seek to impose disclosure requirements with respect
to corporate political spending,71 they do not include the robust disclo-
sure requirements concerning spending through intermediaries de-
scribed above. One proposal includes a requirement that corporations
disclose contributions that were given to an intermediary and trans-
ferred to a third party, but only where those funds were designated
for a particular political purpose. 72  Thus, the proposal does not ap-
pear to address the important scenario in which corporations provide
funds to intermediaries without formally specifying the recipients of
these funds.
The approach we propose - a requirement that companies disclose
both contributions to intermediary organizations and the ultimate po-
litical beneficiaries of these contributions - is essential to providing
shareholders with effective disclosures regarding corporate speech de-
cisions. Without such a requirement, shareholders will lack an accu-
rate picture of the political causes that their money is used to support.
E. Constitutional Permissibility
In this Part, we have analyzed which legal rules would reduce the
likelihood that corporate political speech decisions are a product of a
divergence between the interests of directors and executives and those
of shareholders. However, in the wake of Citizens United, it might be
argued that courts will be suspicious of any corporate law reforms
applying to corporate political speech decisions, particularly because
content-based regulation of speech has been disfavored as a matter of
constitutional law.73 As we explain below, however, although the re-
70 We note that the Conference Board has recently recognized that it may be advisable for
corporations to inquire about how their contributions to intermediaries are actually spent. See
THE CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 63 (manuscript at 24-25).
71 See, e.g., Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4537, iiith Cong. § 4 (2010).
72 See DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175, inth Cong. § 211 (2010).
73 To survive a First Amendment challenge, content-based speech regulations must satisfy
strict scrutiny: that is, they must serve a compelling interest of the state and be "narrowly tailored
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forms that we have put forward would raise some novel constitutional
questions, there is a strong basis for concluding that these reforms
should pass constitutional muster.
To be sure, there are likely to be some constitutional limits on the
choice of corporate law rules in this area. For example, a court would
likely find unconstitutional rules that would subject corporate political
speech decisions to highly expensive procedures that appear to
be clearly motivated by a desire to deter corporate speech rather than
to advance the purposes that internal regulation of corporate deci-
sionmaking ordinarily serves. Such rules could well be viewed as a
roundabout way to limit corporate political speech that is wholly un-
justified by any compelling state interest. But for the reasons given
below, we think that the rules proposed in this Part - which are de-
signed to prevent corporate political speech that is contrary to the in-
terests of a majority of shareholders - should be found constitutional-
ly permissible.
To begin, and most importantly, these rules should not be viewed at
all as limitations on corporate political speech. To assess whether any
First Amendment speech rights have been abridged, a court must first
conclude that the bearer of the right wishes to speak. And, as we have
seen, a corporation is merely a product of legal rules that govern the
relationships between shareholders, directors, and executives. To say
that a corporation has the right to speak, then, leaves open the ques-
tion as to what legal rules should determine whether the corporation
wishes to speak. Lawmakers may reasonably conclude that companies
should not be viewed as wishing to engage in political speech when
such speech is disfavored by the company's shareholders.
Thus, the rules put forward in this Part should be viewed not
as limitations on corporations' rights to engage in speech but rather
as an effort to prevent the use of corporate resources for speech
that the corporation does not wish to engage in. On this view, the
rules we have put forward should be viewed as protecting corpora-
tions' First Amendment speech rights - by ensuring that each corpo-
ration's political speech reflects the wishes of its owners - rather than
limiting them.
Some might go further and argue that shareholders, rather than
corporations, are the actual bearers of the speech rights described in
Citizens United.7 4 While this view could also provide a basis for the
to achieve that interest." FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2oo7) (collecting
cases).
74 This view was elegantly expressed by Justice White over thirty years ago. See First Nat'l
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 806 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) ("[Wihen a profitmaking
corporation contributes to a political candidate this does not further the self-expression or self-
fulfillment of its shareholders in the way that expenditures from them as individuals would.").
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constitutional permissibility of the rules we have put forward, it is not
necessary to take this view in order to conclude that these rules are
permissible. As just explained, the conclusion that the corporation is
the independent bearer of a constitutional right to free speech leaves to
lawmakers the question of determining how the law will assess the
corporation's wishes.
Accepting that the corporation independently bears these rights
does not suggest that the corporation's wishes should be determined
solely by, say, its executives, and surely the Constitution does not re-
quire that result. Fully accepting that the corporation, as a separate
legal entity, is the right-bearer, lawmakers may determine that this le-
gal entity should not be viewed as wishing to engage in speech disfa-
vored by shareholders, and therefore may adopt corporate law rules
designed to prevent the use of corporate resources for speech that the
entity does not wish to pursue.
Furthermore, even if the rules put forward in this Part were viewed
as limitations on corporate political speech, it would be far from clear
that they would be found to be constitutionally impermissible. In par-
ticular, these rules may not be subject to the strict scrutiny analysis
usually reserved for content-based regulations of political speech. Citi-
zens United itself, after all, did not apply that analysis to the disclosure
and disclaimer rules challenged in that case, but upheld those restric-
tions in part because such rules "do not prevent anyone from speak-
ing." 5 Like those regulations, rules providing a role for shareholders
and independent directors would not operate to prevent the corpora-
tion from speaking. Note also that, as discussed earlier in this Part,
the safeguards we propose for political speech decisions are rules that
already apply to other corporate choices.
Moreover, shareholders can eliminate any burden imposed by the
rules by simply opting out of their application. Thus, adding the abili-
ty to opt out substantially strengthens the constitutional case for these
rules. In light of these considerations, and the fact that the Court has
long declined to apply strict scrutiny to securities law rules, 6 the rules
put forward in this Part should survive a First Amendment challenge.
75 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
76 Securities rules result in prior restraints on speech, content-based regulations, and compelled
speech under certain circumstances, yet have generally avoided the strict scrutiny ordinarily trig-
gered by these characteristics. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A
Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1779-80 (2004) (cit-
ing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. I, 38-4o (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting));
cf Frederick Schauer & Richard Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1835-36 (1999) (arguing that a context-specific approach to constitutional




We note that the Citizens United Court appeared to acknowledge
that protection of shareholder interests is a legitimate legislative objec-
tive in this context. To be sure, Justice Kennedy suggested - incor-
rectly, for the reasons given in Part II - that this objective is ade-
quately addressed by existing corporate law rules." But like previous
opinions in this area," Citizens United seems to contemplate that
lawmaking designed to protect shareholders from corporate political
speech decisions contrary to their interests serves a legitimate pur-
pose. 9 This aspect of Citizens United is consistent with our view that
rules reasonably designed to serve such a purpose should be found
constitutionally permissible.
While all the rules put forward in this Part should in our view pass
constitutional muster, they vary in the ease with which they do so. In
particular, the constitutional permissibility of the disclosure require-
ments that we propose is straightforward. As noted earlier, Citizens
United itself upheld extensive disclosure requirements related to cor-
porate political speech; like those requirements, the disclosure rules we
propose "do not prevent anyone from speaking." By contrast, the de-
fault rules we propose with respect to the role of shareholders and in-
dependent directors fall in less well-charted territory, and we expect
that objections to their constitutionality will be raised and carefully
considered by the courts. 0 For the reasons described above, however,
we believe that courts should reject these challenges.
There are also reasons to expect courts to be relatively deferential to lawmakers' judgments
regarding corporate governance rules such as those described in this Part. In particular, courts
may be disinclined to make a constitutional determination regarding the circumstances under
which a corporation wishes to engage in political speech. Cf. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL.,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1374-75 (6th
ed. 2009) (noting that, with respect to the location of a corporation's principal place of business
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, federal courts declined to extend the treatment of corpora-
tions under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(I) (2006) to labor unions, concluding that judgments regarding the
citizenship of these entities were better left to Congress (citing United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bou-
ligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965))).
7 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916.
78 See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 675 (1990) (Brennan,
J., concurring) ("[T]he State surely has a compelling interest in preventing a corporation it
has chartered from exploiting those who do not wish to contribute to [the corporation's] political
message.").
79 We note, moreover, that nothing in Justice Kennedy's opinion suggested that existing mech-
anisms of shareholder protection could not be strengthened or expanded in the corporate political
speech context.
80 For example, a recently enacted Iowa statute, previously discussed in note 54, requiring,
inter alia, board approval of certain political expenditures, see S. 2354, 83d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg.
Sess. § 3 (Iowa 2010) (amending IOWA CODE § 68A. 4 o4 (Supp. 20o9)), is currently the subject of a
First Amendment challenge. See Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,
Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Miller, No. 4:I0-cv-004i6 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 7, 2010).
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We recognize that some of the current interest in reforming the
corporate law rules governing political spending might be motivated
by a desire to limit such spending. We should therefore note that it is
far from clear that the proposals put forward in this Part would have
any such effect. In particular, the proposals may not have that effect if
a significant amount of political spending is favored by a majority of
shareholders in many or most companies. While the effect of our pro-
posed rules on the level of political spending by public companies is
uncertain, the rules can be expected to better align political speech de-
cisions with shareholder interests. Lawmakers considering these rules
should pursue this objective - which should be sufficient motivation
to adopt the rules we have put forward - rather than a reduction in
political spending by public companies.
IV PROTECTING DISSENTING MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
In examining the design of the corporate law rules that should gov-
ern corporate political speech decisions, we have thus far focused on
ensuring that directors and executives do not make decisions that de-
viate from shareholder interests. But lawmakers may also be con-
cerned with a separate objective: adopting rules that protect the inter-
ests of dissenting minority shareholders. Such rules would have a
conceptually different basis from - and would necessitate more de-
manding procedural requirements than - rules designed to ensure
that directors and executives do not make decisions that deviate from
shareholder interests in general. In this section, we consider the extent
to which such rules may be reasonable and constitutionally permissible
for lawmakers to adopt.
A. Why Protect Minority Shareholders?
For many corporate decisions, it is reasonable to let the majority of
shareholders have their way. Allowing the majority of shareholders to
impose their will on the minority makes particular sense when share-
holders have a common interest in the decision. For example, a major-
ity of shareholders has the power to elect directors - the individuals
who make significant decisions on behalf of the firm - and, in most
companies, a majority of shareholders is sufficient to approve a charter
or bylaw amendment.8 1 In such cases, it may be reasonable to assume
that the majority of shareholders is more likely to get the decision right
than the minority, and majority rule would consequently result in deci-
sions most likely to be best for the shareholders' common interest.
81 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03 (1985); CAL. CORP. CODE § 903 (West 2004);




Where the interests of the majority and the minority diverge, how-
ever, corporate law rules sometimes limit the power of the majority
to make decisions that could adversely affect the minority. For exam-
ple, corporate law mandates that certain procedural requirements
be satisfied before a large majority shareholder may effect a "free-
zeout" transaction that could divert resources from minority share-
holders for the benefit of the majority.8 2 Even when no dominant ma-
jority shareholder exists, corporate law limits the ability of a majority
of shareholders, and the directors that shareholders elect, to cause the
corporation to engage in transactions, or to effect distributions, that do
not distribute benefits to shareholders on a pro rata basis. 3 The man-
datory rules that limit the ability of majority shareholders to divert
value from minority shareholders are viewed as important to facilitat-
ing investment in public companies and to the development of stock
markets.84
A simple example illustrates how the interests of minority share-
holders may be implicated in the context of corporate political speech.
Suppose that 6o% of the shareholders of a given public company, ex-
pecting that the company's political spending will support causes they
favor, would like the company to engage in such spending. Suppose
also that the remaining 40% of the shareholders strongly prefer that
the company not engage in political speech - either because they gen-
erally believe that corporations should stay out of politics or because
they expect the company's future political spending to advance politi-
cal causes that they oppose (or merely do not support). In such cases,
should corporate law place any limits on the majority's ability to im-
pose its preferred choices on the minority?
In considering this question, lawmakers may consider two interests
that dissenting minority shareholders have in preventing a majority of
shareholders from spending corporate resources on political speech.
First, permitting a majority of shareholders to engage in such spending
over the objections of the minority may functionally amount to subsi-
dizing the majority's speech at the expense of the minority. Allowing
82 In these transactions, a significant majority shareholder often merges a corporation that is
wholly owned by the majority on terms that divert resources from minority shareholders to the
majority shareholder. See infra note 96.
83 See, e.g., In re Primedia, Inc. Derivative Litig., gio A.2d 248, 260, 261 (Del. Ch. 2006) (find-
ing that allegations that a preferred stock redemption exclusively benefited a controlling share-
holder provided the basis for a claim for breach of the directors' duty of loyalty). See generally
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721 (Del. 1971) (holding that large dividend payments
made at the behest of a majority shareholder do not provide the basis for such a claim where the
dividends were distributed to all shareholders pro rata).
8 See, e.g., Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON.
430, 43o-32 (2008); see also Brudney, supra note 7, at 261-64 (describing this argument in the con-
text of corporate political speech).
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the shareholder majority to extract this subsidy may thus be viewed as
a diversion of corporate resources from the minority to the majority,
and consequently regarded as comparable to the diversion of value
from the minority to the majority constrained by corporate rules.
In response to this claim, it might be argued that the volitional na-
ture of shareholder participation in public companies provides share-
holders with sufficient protection from value diversion related to polit-
ical speech. On this view, shareholders who are ex post displeased by
a company's political spending can protect themselves by simply sell-
ing their shares - and, moreover, to the extent that shareholders are
concerned about such ex post outcomes, corporations seeking to attract
investment from public investors have sufficient incentive to provide
investors ex ante with optimal protective mechanisms. These, howev-
er, are generic objections that may be raised in response to the many
existing mandatory corporate law rules that protect minority share-
holders from diversions of value by the majority. The literature pro-
vides extensive analysis showing why the operation of markets is gen-
erally not sufficient to obviate the need for mandatory protection of
minority shareholders. 5
Second, and importantly, lawmakers might be concerned with mi-
nority shareholders' First Amendment interest in not being forced
to be associated with political speech that they do not support - even
when the speech at issue involves very small amounts of corporate
resources. Some shareholders may oppose being associated with any
speech that they do not in fact support; others may take issue with be-
ing associated with speech that they in fact oppose. Whatever the rea-
son, the First Amendment interests of minority shareholders may
be adversely affected by a regime that permits the majority of share-
holders to force them to be associated with the corporation's political
speech.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the First Amend-
ment's protection of "[f]reedom of association . . . plainly presupposes a
freedom not to associate."16  Of course, the Court has generally ad-
dressed this principle in the context of legislation that imposes
85 See, e.g., Edward Glaeser et al., Coase Versus the Coasians, 116 Q.J. ECON. 853, 896-97
(2001); see also Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, supra note 25, at
1835-51 (showing that, in firms with a dominant shareholder, market forces alone will not prevent
the adoption of value-decreasing charter amendments).
86 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 64o, 648 (2000) (alterations in original) (quoting Roberts
v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 6o9, 623 (1984)). This Term the Court expressly acknowledged the rela-
tionship between these associational freedoms and free speech rights in a case addressing the con-
stitutionality of rules requiring student organizations to comply with a university's nondiscrimina-
tion policy. See Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2985 (2010) ("Insisting that an organization embrace unwelcome mem-
bers . . . 'directly and immediately affects associational rights.'" (quoting Dale, 530 U.S. at 659)).
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requirements on associations that compromise the association's mes-
sage - for example, a law requiring that the association admit certain
members.87 But the Court has also acknowledged individuals' consti-
tutional interest in avoiding association with political messages with
which they disagree - holding, for example, that unions violate
the First Amendment rights of their members when union leaders
spend union funds for political speech that the individual members
oppose, even when the speech is in the members' collective interest.8
In such cases, the Court has held, laws requiring individuals to
be union members may be remedied by providing those individuals
with the right to opt out of spending in support of political speech with
which they disagree.89
Thus, the Court has recognized the First Amendment value of pro-
tecting individuals from being required to finance political speech con-
trary to their preferences, even where those protections may impose
costs on the majority. To be sure, it may be suggested that the union
case and the public company case are distinguishable because partici-
pation may be required by law in the former but not the latter. How-
ever, as explained earlier, the volitional nature of being a shareholder
in a public company does not protect shareholders from the conse-
quences of political speech they disfavor.
It should be noted that the Citizens United Court did not accept
the government's "asserted interest" in "protecting dissenting share-
holders from being compelled to fund corporate political speech" as a
justification for a ban on corporate speech for a specified period prior
to elections.90 But the Court held only that this interest could not jus-
tify a ban, noting that, as a protective device for this interest, the ban
was both underinclusive (since dissenting shareholders' interests are
implicated whether or not an election is approaching) and overinclu-
sive (since the ban applied even to firms with a single shareholder-
manager, such as Citizens United itself).9 ' The Court seemed to accept
the legitimacy of the government's interest in protecting dissenting
shareholders, but reasoned that, with respect to firms with more than
one shareholder, "the remedy is not to restrict speech but to consider
and explore other regulatory mechanisms."92 We thus believe that
87 See, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S. at 648; N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13
(1988).
88 See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977); see also Brudney, su-
pra note 7, at 269-70 (recognizing first the relevance of this principle in the corporate law context).
89 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 240-41 (citing Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122
(1963) (describing such a remedy)).
90 Citizens United, 13o S. CL at 911.
91 See id.
92 Id.
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mechanisms that are properly tailored to the purpose of protecting mi-
nority shareholders may well be constitutionally permissible.
B. How Could Minority Shareholders Be Protected?
While a comprehensive analysis of the possible options for pro-
tecting the interests of dissenting minority shareholders with respect to
corporate political speech decisions is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment, we would like to outline one possible approach, which would
involve a refinement of the type of rule we discussed in section III.A.
Suppose that lawmakers adopt a rule under which companies are not
permitted to spend on political speech unless a budget for that purpose
is approved in the company's preceding annual meeting. Rather than
requiring approval by at least 50% of shareholders, as discussed in sec-
tion III.A, suppose that the rule required approval by a higher thresh-
old, X%, and that, to be consistent with the minority protection goal of
such a rule, the rule allowed opting out of it only with the approval of
the same higher threshold of X% of the company's shareholders.93 Is
such a rule desirable and constitutionally permissible? How does the
answer to this question depend on the value of X?
At one extreme, consider a rule requiring unanimous approval of
political speech by all holders of the corporation's outstanding shares
(that is, X = ioo% of outstanding shares). Professor Brudney put for-
ward the possibility of such a rule.94 A unanimity requirement would
prevent even a single unwilling shareholder from being forced to be
associated with political speech, reflecting the view that the interests of
unwilling minority shareholders in avoiding compelled association
with political speech should not be meaningfully balanced against oth-
er considerations. If one does not hold such an absolutist view of the
rights of minority shareholders, however, such a rule would seem to go
much too far. A public company typically has numerous shareholders,
and participation in votes is generally much less than 100%. Thus, a
rule requiring unanimous approval by all shareholders would make
corporate political speech practically impossible.
Furthermore, even if one were to require unanimous approval by
all the shareholders participating in a vote (that is, X = ioo% of votes
cast), such a requirement could reasonably be viewed as too demand-
ing. Suppose that thousands of shareholders of a public company,
holding millions of shares, vote in favor of the company's proposed po-
93 As discussed earlier, see supra section III.C.x, p. 102-o3, lawmakers should consider wheth-
er such opting out should sunset after several years to ensure that opting out continues to enjoy
the requisite shareholder support.
94 See Brudney, supra note 7, at 259-60 (concluding that there is "little basis in law or logic"
for the notion underlying the claim that "a requirement of unanimous consent would run afoul of
the First Amendment," id. at 259 (footnote omitted)).
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litical speech, and one shareholder holding just ten shares votes
against. Allowing the objections of this shareholder to carry the day
might ascribe too much weight to the interests of this shareholder.
And courts may well conclude that such a requirement is constitution-
ally impermissible, because as a functional matter the requirement is
an excessive hindrance to political speech desired by an overwhelming
majority of shareholders.
At the same time, however, setting X above 50% should in our view
pass constitutional muster as long as it is set sufficiently below ioo%
- say, at three-fifths, two-thirds, three-quarters, or four-fifths of the
votes cast - to give corporations a practically meaningful opportunity
to obtain the required approval. In our view, it would not be unrea-
sonable, or constitutionally impermissible, for lawmakers to set X at a
value greater than 5o% because the benefits of such a rule for minority
shareholders may well exceed the costs it imposes on the shareholder
majority.
Suppose, for example, that a bare majority of shareholders - say,
50% plus one vote - favors a company's political speech, and the
rest - 50% minus one vote - are opposed. If such a vote were
deemed sufficient for the corporation to speak, the members of the mi-
nority would have to bear the costs of being associated with speech
with which they do not wish to be associated. By contrast, if approval
by a bare majority were deemed insufficient for the corporation to
speak, the members of the majority would lose the opportunity to ad-
vance the political causes they favor through the corporation but
might still be able to do so outside the corporation; thus, the majority
would be able to mitigate or limit some of the costs of setting X at a
value greater than 50%.
Lawmakers seeking to go beyond bare-majority approval to protect
the interests of dissenting minorities should carefully consider the re-
quired level of approval. In doing so, they should consider the existing
use of supermajority requirements in other corporate contexts. Many
companies have charter provisions that require supermajority approv-
al for mergers, with such requirements commonly ranging between
two-thirds and three-quarters of outstanding shares. 95 Business com-
bination statutes also impose supermajority requirements for freezeout
transactions. 96 Whether or not one supports the supermajority provi-
95 Kenneth A. Borokhovich et al., Variation in the Monitoring Incentives of Outside Stock-
holders, 49 J.L. & ECON. 651, 657 (2oo6) (noting that supermajority requirements for mergers are
"typically between 66 and 8o percent"); see also JERILYN J. CASTILLO & PETER J. McANIFF,
THE PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO INVESTMENT BANKING, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS,
CORPORATE FINANCE 355 (2007) (describing such requirements as typically around two-thirds).
96 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a) (Supp. 2008) (requiring that a fifteen percent or great-
er shareholder seeking to complete a freezeout obtain (i) approval of the target board; (ii) eighty-
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sions in these other contexts, evidence concerning the effects of these
provisions may be used to inform lawmakers' assessments of which
supermajority requirements would give corporations a practically
meaningful opportunity to engage in political speech.
V. CONCLUSION
Public corporations' decisions to engage in political speech should
not continue to be governed by the same rules that apply to ordinary
business decisions. Instead, lawmakers should design special rules
concerning how corporations make these decisions. Designing such
rules has been long overdue, and Citizens United makes the need to do
so all the more acute by expanding the scope of constitutionally pro-
tected corporate political speech.
We have sought to provide a framework for designing corporate
governance rules for political speech decisions. We have examined
which rules would best address agency problems and align political
speech decisions with the interests of shareholders. We have put for-
ward rules based on a combination of shareholder voting, oversight by
independent directors, and detailed transparency requirements that in-
clude robust disclosure of spending through intermediaries. We have
also analyzed the extent to which, and ways in which, corporate gov-
ernance rules should go further and seek to provide protection to dis-
senting minority shareholders from forced association with corporate
political speech that enjoys the explicit or implicit support of the
majority. We hope that our analysis will provide a framework for
policymaking in this important area. 7
five percent of the outstanding shares in a single transaction; or (iii) approval of two-thirds of the
other shareholders in order to complete a freezeout). These requirements survived a preemption
challenge because they give bidders a "meaningful opportunity for success," BNS Inc. v. Koppers
Co., 683 F. SupP. 458, 469 (D. Del. 1988), but recent work has sought to question this conclusion
on empirical grounds. See generally Guhan Subramanian et al., Is Delaware's Antitakeover Stat-
ute Unconstitutional? Evidence from zp88-2oo8, 65 Bus. LAW. 685 (20oo) (finding that no hostile
bidders in the nineteen years since the Delaware statute's adoption have been able to overcome
the eighty-five percent threshold).
9 While we have focused on political speech decisions, the framework we put forward may
also be used to assess the rules governing corporations' decisions to make charitable contribu-
tions. Like political speech, corporate charitable contributions are, under current law, governed
by the rules that govern companies' ordinary business decisions. And, like political speech, there
may be reason to believe that special rules are needed to ensure that decisions regarding corporate
charitable contributions are in shareholders' interests. For a comprehensive analysis of corporate
governance rules that could address corporate charitable contributions, see Victor Brudney & Al-
len Ferrell, Corporate Charitable Giving, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1191 (2002).
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